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THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: THE IMPORTANCE OF ARBITRATOR 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Society relies on the fair resolution of disputes submitted to arbitration. 
Those who undertake the role of arbitrators hence have a duty to the parties as well 
as to the general public to refrain from unethical conduct during proceedings.1 
Although courts usually advocate legal standards that protect arbitrators from 
parties challenging their conduct, courts must ensure that arbitration proceedings 
remain free from corruption, bias, and the appearance of impropriety.2 Therefore, 
if arbitrators violate ethical standards, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) 
grants courts the right to vacate the award.3  
 Section 10 of the FAA lists the grounds under which a court may vacate an 
arbitral award.4 Since partiality and corruption would fuel public distrust in the 
arbitration system, the drafters included subsection 2 within Section 10(a).5 This 
portion of the FAA states that the losing party can challenge the award if there 
exists “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.”6 Since 
the FAA does not provide an explicit definition of what constitutes “evident 
partiality,” the interpretation of the phrase has significant consequences on the 
success of parties challenging the award.7 If read to demand only the “appearance 
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1 Linden Fry, Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse: Why the Fifth Circuit’s Ruling in 
Positive Software Solutions Sacrifices Procedural Fairness for Speed and Convenience, 58 
CATH. U.L. REV. 599, 600-601 (2009).  
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 602-604.  
5 Id.  
6 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) 
7 Fry, supra note 1, at 604.  




of bias,” challenging an arbitration award under Section 10(a)(2) will be the sole 
method of vacating an award without the presence of “actual and prejudicial 
wrongdoing.”8 This is important because demonstrating actual bias requires a 
higher standard of proof than a mere appearance of bias.9 Meeting an elevated 
standard is problematic because the arbitration process is generally private and 
lacks proper documentation.10  
 
II.  DASE PRECEDENT 
 
A. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty  
 
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty, the Supreme 
Court examined the meaning of “evident partiality” within Section 10(a)(2) of the 
FAA.11 The Court held that a secret financial relationship with a lawyer for one of 
the parties supplied the basis for vacating an arbitrator’s decision.12 After the three-
arbitrator panel had given its decision, it was discovered that the neutral arbitrator 
had previously engaged in business transactions with one of the parties at regular 
intervals.13 The Court noted that the parties exchanged about $12,000 during that 
partnership.14 The relationship, however, was not constant and no dealings 
occurred between the party and the arbitrator for a year prior to the arbitration.15 
Nevertheless, the Court vacated the decision concluding that the arbitrator’s lack of 
disclosure prior to the start of arbitration represented evident partiality.16 In his 
analysis of Section 10(a)(2), Justice Black posited that Congress intended the 
                                                 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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11 See generally, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).  
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14 Id.  
15 Id.  
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“evident partiality” clause to ensure an impartial and fair arbitral process.17 
Reasoning that Congress anticipated that arbitrators would abide by principles of 
“strict fairness and morality,” Justice Black held that arbitrators should be subject 
to the “appearance of bias standard.”18  
 In his concurrence, Justice White added that if both parties receive 
information of the relationship ahead of time and still agree to the arbitrator, they 
should be able to continue.19 However, Justice White did note that if the arbitrator 
had a significant interest in a firm, such information must be disclosed.20  
 
B. Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive 
Software II) 
 
 In Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage Corp., two 
companies in the mortgage industry submitted their dispute to the American 
Arbitration Association.21 After a seven-day arbitration hearing, the arbitrator 
issued an award in favor of New Century.22 However, the arbitrator and his 
previous law firm had worked with New Century’s lawyer in a previous case.23 As 
a result, Positive Software filed a motion to vacate the award.24 The district court 
granted the motion because the association between New Century and the 
arbitrator created the “appearance of impropriety.”25 The case was appealed.26  
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
evident partiality cannot be founded on an “arbitrator’s undisclosed trivial or 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 151-152.  
20 Id.  
21 Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 
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24 Id.  
25 Id.  
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insubstantial prior relationship with one of the parties.”27 The court emphasized 
that the phrase “reasonable impression of bias” must be read broadly.28 
Accordingly, since the court found that the link between New Century’s counsel 
and the arbitrator was minute, vacatur was inappropriate.29  
 Addressing the issues of policy and practicality, the court reasoned that 
permitting vacatur for trivial relationships would undermine the finality of 
arbitration.30 The court further reasoned that commonly permitting vacatur would 
remove many of the best arbitrators from practice since those arbitrators who tend 
to have the greatest amount of specialized knowledge and expertise in the field 
also tend to have the greatest amount of prior contacts with parties seeking 
arbitration.31  
 
III.  DURRENT CASE LAW 
 
A.  Midwest Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum Chemical Corp.  
 
In Midwest Generation, Continuum Chemical Corporation (Continuum) 
filed a petition to vacate the award due to the evident partiality of an arbitrator.32 
Continuum asserted that it should be permitted to engage in limited discovery of 
one of the arbitrators (Mr. Sklar) since it had substantial evidence that the 
arbitrator purposefully hid a continuous business relationship between the 
Construction Law Group, Bell Boyd & Lloyd, Schiff Hardin LLP, and himself.33 
Continuum contended that by not disclosing his professional contacts, Mr. Sklar 
                                                 
27 Id. at 285-286. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285-286. 
32 Midwest Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum Chem. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61635 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2010).  
33 Id. at 1-6. 
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breached his duty to disclose any relationship or circumstance likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and that which might reasonably 
affect lack of independence or impartiality.34 
 Continuum argued that it needed to merely establish “clear evidence of 
impropriety that might create an appearance of bias.”35 The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, however, rejected such a theory, 
contending that an objective standard must be applied in determining whether 
adequate evidence of impropriety exists.36 The court proposed the following 
definition: “evident partiality exists when an arbitrator’s bias is ‘direct, definite, 
and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative.’ ”37 If a 
reasonable observer would decide that an arbitrator was partial, it could only then 
be said that an arbitration award should be vacated.38 As such, this case established 
that it is necessary to inquire whether the reasonable observer would conclude that 
there exists “clear evidence of impropriety.”39  
  
B.  Vinco Painting v. Painters District Council  
 
In Vinco Painting v. Painters District Council, Vinco Painting Inc. (Vinco) 
brought a class action pursuant to Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947 to vacate two arbitration awards entered against the Painters 
District Council.40 Vinco challenged the arbitration awards on three grounds, one 
of which was the purported evident impartiality of the board.41 Vinco contended 
that Joint Trade Board (JTB) member Anderson displayed “evident partiality,” or 
                                                 
34 Id. at 39-46.  
35 Id. at 10.  
36 Id. at 12-14 
37 Midwest Generation EME, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61635, at *5.  
38 Id.   
39 Id. at 14.  
40 Vinco Painting v. Painters Dist. Council, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72896, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
July 19, 2010). 
41 Id. at 1-3.  




at a minimum, “had a real or apparent conflict of interest” under the regulations of 
JTB.42 Vinco brought forth the following two pieces of evidence to support his 
contention: 1) Anderson’s engagement in a hearing in which an award was 
rendered against Vinco even though Vinco was not at the hearing; 2) Anderson’s 
offensive comments towards Vinco.43  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
rejected Vinco’s first argument simply stating that such an argument served as 
insufficient grounds for vacating an award.44 The court also rejected Vinco’s 
second argument stating that even if the offensive comments were actually made, 
they did not demonstrate evident partiality on the behalf of the entire board.45 
Anderson was one of only eight board members who unanimously opposed 
Vinco.46 No evidence existed that he influenced the other board members to vote 
against Vinco.47 Rejecting both of Vinco’s arguments, the court held that Vinco 
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as “to the existence of evident 
partiality on the part of the JTB.”48 As such, the court found that the Union was 
entitled to summary judgment on the evident partiality claim.49 
In its analysis, the court reasoned that the parties agreed on a “joint 
arbitration board structure.”50 The JTB realized that each conflict before the board 
would place an employer against Union Representatives.51 Anticipating such a 
dilemma, the board allowed for equal voting groups of employer-appointed and 
Union representatives.52 As such, the manner in which the JTB was organized was 
                                                 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 17.  
44 Id. at 27.  
45 Vinco Painting, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72896, at *23-30.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 31.  
49 Id.  
50 Vinco Painting, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72896, at *27-28.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
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meant to counterbalance the inherent biases of the board members.53 Hence, the 
court concluded that there was insufficient proof of evident partiality.54 
 
C.  CRC v. Computer Sciences Corp. 
 
In CRC, plaintiffs proposed that since a professional association existed 
between the law firm of the arbitration panel chairman and the law firm acting on 
behalf of Computer Sciences Corporation (Computer Sciences), the chairman was 
biased toward Computer Sciences.55 JP Morgan had hired Computer Sciences to do 
some work. Their contract stated that Computer Sciences must use CRC “as its 
subcontractor for internet technology consulting services.”56 Computer Sciences 
entered into an agreement with CRC which required the presence of three unbiased 
arbitrators.57 CRC appointed Francis Conrad to serve as one of the arbitrators while 
Computer Sciences appointed John Lovi to serve as the other arbitrator.58 Conrad 
and Lovi then choose Richard Silberberg to serve as the chair of the panel.59  
The ethical conflict stemmed from CRC’s suspicions of Richard 
Silberberg.60 Within his disclosure statement, Silberberg referred to only one prior 
situation between the law firm acting on behalf of Computer Sciences 
(McDermott, Will & Emery LLP) and his law firm (Dorsey & Whitney LLP).61 
However, CRC pointed out that Dorsey & Whitney LLP worked with McDermott 
on “at least five federal cases pending before and/or during Silberberg’s tenure as 
chairman and in four of those cases the two firms served as co-counsel.”62 Since 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 CRC v. Computer Sciences Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109562, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 14, 2010).  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
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Silberberg was an equity partner, CRC proposed that Silberberg obtained 
significant monetary compensation as a result of this relationship.63 Both firms 
have been listed on signature pages of court records, Dorsey attorneys have 
supported pro hac admissions of McDermott lawyers, and Silberberg was directly 
responsible for nine lawyers working as co-counsel with McDermott lawyers 
throughout his time as chairman.64 CRC argued that the importance of such 
relationships is magnified by the fact that several of the cases concerned a client 
with an established relationship with Computer Sciences.65 
After an analysis of the facts, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the facts would not cause a reasonable 
person to conclude that evident partiality existed.66 The court concluded that 
although it would have been ethically proper to disclose the information, the 
evidence proved insufficient to establish the evident partiality necessary to vacate 
an award since the relationships proved too weak to establish more than a 




Although the Supreme Court has previously interpreted “evident 
partiality” to require a “reasonable impression of possible bias” by the arbitrator, 
the line distinguishing what constitutes a “reasonable impression” and what 
constitutes “actual bias” is not definite.68 There is also currently no agreement 
among the various circuits as to what information an arbitrator needs to disclose 
and when exactly nondisclosure turns into evident partiality. The only thing that is 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 CRC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109562, at *10-11. 
66 Id. at 12.  
67  Id. at 14.  
68 See generally, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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clear is that evident partiality can arise either through prejudicial conduct during 
the arbitral trial or through a failure to disclose. 
Most of the vagueness surrounding evident partiality would be eliminated 
if Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA were expanded to include a clear definition of 
evident partiality and a separate section was added detailing exactly what should 
be disclosed, when it should be disclosed, etc. This section should be very detailed 
since then arbitrators would have clear guidelines that they could follow. In 
rewriting Section 10(a)(2), an important question to consider is whether different 
standards should apply to neutral arbitrators as opposed to party appointed 
arbitrators. It can be argued that the neutral arbitrator should be subject to higher 
disclosure standards since oftentimes, the outcome of an arbitral decision hinges on 
the neutral arbitrator. As such, even the slightest hint of partiality could be 
detrimental to the fairness of an arbitral proceeding. Although subjecting neutral 
arbitrators to such an elevated standard may lend credibility to arbitration, it may 
become difficult to find arbitrators who are completely neutral yet are still experts 
in the relevant field.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION  
 
The influx of recent case law surrounding evident partiality emphasizes 
not only the importance of erring on the side of caution when it comes to 
disclosure but also that parties have a duty to conduct due diligence in the 
investigation of arbitration. An arbitrator has an ethical duty to provide a hearing 
that is “fundamentally fair” yet the line separating a fundamentally fair hearing 
from one that is not is blurry. Hence, to ensure the continued validity of the arbitral 
process, there is an immediate need to update Section 10 of the FAA. By providing 
an explicit definition of evident partiality and including a section on disclosure 
requirements, arbitral proceedings will be one step closer to freedom from 
corruption and bias. 
